Michael, even with a national focus surely we can accept the signalling value of reducing contributions to the global carbon footprint and other harmful emissions. There is a significant benefit in air quality when reducing fossil fuel consumption. If smaller countries adopt the stance that they are excused from participating in the global effort to reduce emissions, especially those that have reaped most of the benefits of the increase over the last couple of centuries, then we remove incentives for larger countries to participate. Isn't effective economic policy about creating favourable incentives?
It is fascinating that the adverse geopolitical impacts you describe as a result of the global warming trend are precisely those predicted by proponents of political cycles, such as Strauss and Howe's Fourth Turning and George Friedman's institutional and socio-economic cycles. It makes me wonder if the weather played a far larger role in historical events than these commentators considered.
There's a lot to unpack in your comment. First, I'm sure we all appreciate the aesthetic and air-quality benefits of reducing fossil fuel consumption. I'm all for it. But my point is that we should recognize that this is displacement activity, not a way to 'tackle climate change'. All the combined efforts of nations so far have made no difference that I can see to the rise in CO2 concentrations, or even to its delta.
Really, the data is in: this approach has failed, is failing and will fail.
Second, I'm not sure the incentive argument will work. In the unlikely event that globally fossil fuels actually do fall, then, surprise surprise, we will expect a fall in the oil price. What will prove more powerful as an incentive engine: moral approval or price? My money would be on price.
Third, if we accept that current attempts to curb CO2 concentrations have, are, and will fail, then we have to start thinking of other approaches. In another place (the SDP's End of Indifference Paper) I suggested that all countries, according to their wealth, should be paying countries hosting significant rain forests for the climatalogical and environmental services those forests provide - currently for free.
That would give a proper price incentive to Brazil, Indonesia, Papua, etc to preserve and value those forests. Because we really really do depend on them. If we're going to spend money to deliver a change in incentive structures, surely this would work better, and faster?
Anyway, do read the book. I think you'll find the chapter on the fall of the Ming and the rise of the Qing absolutely fascinating.
Michael, even with a national focus surely we can accept the signalling value of reducing contributions to the global carbon footprint and other harmful emissions. There is a significant benefit in air quality when reducing fossil fuel consumption. If smaller countries adopt the stance that they are excused from participating in the global effort to reduce emissions, especially those that have reaped most of the benefits of the increase over the last couple of centuries, then we remove incentives for larger countries to participate. Isn't effective economic policy about creating favourable incentives?
It is fascinating that the adverse geopolitical impacts you describe as a result of the global warming trend are precisely those predicted by proponents of political cycles, such as Strauss and Howe's Fourth Turning and George Friedman's institutional and socio-economic cycles. It makes me wonder if the weather played a far larger role in historical events than these commentators considered.
There's a lot to unpack in your comment. First, I'm sure we all appreciate the aesthetic and air-quality benefits of reducing fossil fuel consumption. I'm all for it. But my point is that we should recognize that this is displacement activity, not a way to 'tackle climate change'. All the combined efforts of nations so far have made no difference that I can see to the rise in CO2 concentrations, or even to its delta.
Really, the data is in: this approach has failed, is failing and will fail.
Second, I'm not sure the incentive argument will work. In the unlikely event that globally fossil fuels actually do fall, then, surprise surprise, we will expect a fall in the oil price. What will prove more powerful as an incentive engine: moral approval or price? My money would be on price.
Third, if we accept that current attempts to curb CO2 concentrations have, are, and will fail, then we have to start thinking of other approaches. In another place (the SDP's End of Indifference Paper) I suggested that all countries, according to their wealth, should be paying countries hosting significant rain forests for the climatalogical and environmental services those forests provide - currently for free.
That would give a proper price incentive to Brazil, Indonesia, Papua, etc to preserve and value those forests. Because we really really do depend on them. If we're going to spend money to deliver a change in incentive structures, surely this would work better, and faster?
Anyway, do read the book. I think you'll find the chapter on the fall of the Ming and the rise of the Qing absolutely fascinating.