HS2 will no longer be extended beyond Birmingham to serve the North. That will come as a sad surprise to absolutely nobody in those regions, where we’ve been schooled to ignore such promises by decades of national policy to let the North’s railway connections rot. Throw the Green Book at ‘em!
Westminster was sincere in its ambitions to link Leeds to London via a bullet-train? Sure, just like both parties will make good on their regular pre-election promises to electrify the cross-Pennines rail line - you know, the one where they’ve still got a man walking in front waving a red flag. Yeah, sure, that bullet train will just fly into Leeds, a major city still waiting for a domestic transit system.
So forget the insult to those North of Birmingham - we expect no better. Rather, every taxpayer, North and South, should be united in their pain and outrage at the way HS2 has shaken them down. No highwayman with his ‘your money or your life’ was ever so greedy, ever so ruthless, ever so off-the-scale insulting as the HS2 boondoggle has been, and is still being.
Consider the comparisons: right now HS2 ‘Phase One’ is estimated to be rising up to near £300mn per mile (wait a couple of months, it’ll get there, for sure). £300mn per mile - or £170,500 per yard, or just under £5000 per inch - is simply a mind-boggling deviation from international norms. Take a look at this chart, from the Telegraph.
I haven’t got, and can’t find, the underlying data, so can’t be strictly accurate. But I work with data every day, all the time, and to my eye, the HS2 cost is far more than a three standard deviation from the ex-HS2 average. By sight, my guess would be five or six standard deviations.
Even a three standard deviation outlier tells you something is very very wrong. And there are only two explanations which fit:
I) The entire project is rife with massive multi-billion pound corruption. From the civil servants and government ministers who gave it the OK, to the consultants who provided supporting ammo, to the main contractors doing the project planning and management, to the sub-contractors doing the work, and to the suppliers of machinery, steel, and labour for the project. In my book, all must be under direct suspicion they are swimming in a sewer of corruption. Yes, innocent until proven guilty, but, my god, there’s suspicion.
If anything like this happened in an Asian country, everyone would ‘know’ just what was happening. And eventually, they’d get the handcuffs on, and/or the suicides or ‘disappearances’, or ‘flight to Las Vegas’ would follow.
II) The entire project is being systematically sabotaged by the ugly bramble-patch of governmental redundancy, duplication and complexity which stymies so much else in the UK. In which case, we need to recognise that, whatever justifications are offered for it, this is, inter alia, a disgraceful conspiracy against the taxpayer.
Corruption or institutional conspiracy against the taxpayer? Or both?
If we can get to the bottom of it and lay down the needed reforms hard and fast, maybe the billions shovelled down HS2’s greedy maw can yet be value for money. If we can identify just how this got so wildly out of control, and make the reforms to ensure that nothing like this can ever happen again, then maybe, just maybe, we can get some value for money. Thus far, and no further, ever.
How to do it? We have to pursue both possibilities - corruption and/or governmental sabotage - without fear or favour. It will not be easy: the billions handed out by HS2 means that potentially all parts of the establishment may have been on the take. So the corruption investigations cannot be undertaken by any part of the establishment. Rather, we need to draft in corruption-seekers from abroad. The Hong Kong ICAC had a fearsome reputation (dungeons in the basement of Murray House housing those under investigation). There are many British ICAC officers currently in retirement (I know some of them personally). Maybe they could be persuaded to take ‘one last job’? Or if Hong Kongers aren’t to your taste, let’s approach Singapore, which nurtures its reputation as a ‘clean’ place, so they might be prepared to lend us taxpayers a hand?
What would such an investigation entail? As a start, you’d want the finances of all senior civil servants, politicians, consultants and financiers who have had any hand in this project put under a microscope. Niceties about privacy can be no bar to these investigations - the taxpayer’s interest in finding out where the money has gone is urgent, and must take precedence.
Then hire the world’s best investigative auditors, because the taxpayer’s interests are at stake. Every contract, every invoice, every financial contract, we need to see them and to know they were straight. Where deviations from market prices are found, we need to know why they were tolerated.
Once again, the problem is obvious: none of those accountancy firms which have taken ‘management consultancy’ contracts with HS2 can do the work, because they are under suspicion. Once again, we need ‘clean hands’ to do the work, even if that means drafting in auditors from overseas.
Finally, and probably most importantly, we need a root and branch investigation into whether Britain’s system and structure of government was directly or indirectly responsible for this debacle. Quite obviously, this investigation cannot be carried out via a ‘Royal Commission’ or anything involving Britain’s great and good, because the great and good are precisely those who build and administered this great web of complexity and redundancy.
Who can carry out this work? I think there are two alternatives. First, we could draft in the armed forces to do this work. Yes, their record in arms procurement is wretched, but on the other hand, when it comes down to it, they have to understand lines of authority and command, because lives depend on it. Can they perceive clear lines of command and accountability in Britain’s governmental system? And if not, what would they suggest as a remedy?
Or we could approach governments which clearly do work, to untangle Britain’s organisational chart. Again, I’d suggest Singapore as a possibility, but I’d go so far as to even consider the Japanese, or even the French - lord! - for the job.
If we’re really desperate (and we should be), maybe there’s a job for one Mr T Blair. Maybe he’d do it at ‘mates rates’?
Nah, just joking.
The bottom line is this: if HS2 is a text-book case in disastrous management, we need to write that text-book fast, and learn it well. That way, maybe we can start to re-fashion a system of government so that it can work for the people, rather than against than robbing them in HS2 fashion.
I take issue with 2 minor points, but am in wholehearted agreement with the main thrust of the article:
1. HS2 not going past Birmingham is a blessing for the North. The last thing we need is easier travel to and from the Great Wen. Better that the money be literally put in a pit and set on fire than that more north-south track should be laid.
2. Your comparison with international equivalents only looks at European examples - I understand large American cities rack up similar price tags per mile for their white elephant infrastructure projects (almost certainly for exactly the same reasons).